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Introduction: the rise of the “better regulation”
agenda1
Governments worldwide are confronted with in-
creasing demands to improve the quality of their re-
gulatory activities. Such demands are expressed by 
a variety of actors: business associations complain
about regulatory costs and bureaucratic burdens
associated with complying with government regula-
tion; consumer and user groups demand tight regu-
lation of market players in areas such as food safety,
public transport, energy and, of course, the financial
market. Even public services such as schools, hospi-
tals and universities are increasingly held account-
able to deliver results measured against explicit stan-
dards of performance. Scholars of regulation can
hardly be surprised by such demands,since they have
long diagnosed the move towards regulation as an
increasingly important public policy tool, given the
exhaustion of spending and public provision as alter-
native modes of governance (Majone 1994). The
recent global financial crisis will reinforce this trend,
given the depletion of governments’ resources after
bank bailouts and the proliferation of economic
stimulus packages.
In other words, regulation is here to stay, and there-
fore the issue of high quality regulation is ever more
important. While the quality of regulation is not at
all a new issue, the development of a comprehensive
better regulation agenda as a specific activity of gov-
ernmental reforms is of relatively new origin,though
it is slowly maturing and approaching “middle age”.
For the first time, in 1995, the OECD defined guide-
lines for regulatory reform and established “better
regulation” as a field for “whole-of-government”
reform. According to these guidelines, a range of
instruments from the better regulation toolbox
should be made mandatory and governance struc-
tures should be institutionalised in order to embed
better regulation as a key concern in everyday regu-
latory activities of ministries and regulatory agen-
cies. Since the early 2000s, a transnational communi-
ty of practice has emerged in Europe, which consists
of governmental officials, in particular from better
regulation units situated in core executive depart-
ments (finance ministries, head of government of-
fices), think tanks and foundations supporting the
cause of better regulation, like the Bertelsmann
Foundation in Germany. This international commu-
nity is a key driver for the rapid diffusion of better
regulation tools – such as Regulatory Impact Assess-
ment (RIA) or cost measurement tools, such as the
Standard Cost Model (SCM;to be explored below) –
across European countries and the wider OECD
world over the past decade (Wegrich 2009a).
Today, almost all OECD countries claim to have
adopted a better regulation policy and established
mandatory procedures for improving regulation
such as RIA or consultation procedures (OECD
2009, 99–101). However, even after 10 to 15 years of
experience, the success of these reforms is not yet
evident. Complaints about regulatory quality are as
loudly voiced today as ever.Proclamations about the
success of better regulation activities – such as the
reduction of administrative burden for business (by
25 percent in the Netherlands by 2007,similar reduc-
tions are projected for 2010 and 2011 in the UK and
Germany) – are not reflected in similar levels of
enthusiasm among the targeted stakeholders. This
paper argues that the challenge of better regulation
policies to deliver their promise of improving the
quality of government regulation rests on two related
aspects. First, the ambition of better regulation to
improve the regulation of governmental systems
(rather than in individual regulatory fields) leads to a
complex governance logic that requires carefully
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crafted institutional reforms in order to become effec-
tive. Second, objectives of “better regulation” are
shaped by different and contested understandings of
what good regulation really is; compromises between
these different understandings of good regulation
have so far led to some groups’ disappointment and
frequent agenda change in some countries, limiting
policy coherence. This paper will explore how differ-
ent European governments – including Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK and the EU Commission – cope
with these two challenges.This comparison will show
that all governments follow increasingly “smart”
approaches in dealing with the challenges posed by
the complexity of the better regulation governance
logic, but struggle with the challenge related to con-
tested understandings of good regulation.
What is “better regulation”? Objectives and
instruments
The core assumption of the better regulation agenda
is that governments systematically produce regula-
tion of poorer quality than is desirable and feasible.
This deficiency is systemic because regulatory fail-
ures are not the result of human error, but result
from inherent traits in the regulatory system. In-
stitutional change is needed to enhance the capacity
of governments to produce high-quality regulations
(for the OECD definition of high quality regulation,
see OECD 2005, 3). However, different advocacy
groups contest what the key cause and symptom of
regulatory failure is. The following three perspec-
tives are among the most audible in the debate on
better regulation (OECD 2005; Lodge and Wegrich
2009; Radaelli and Meuwese 2009; Radaelli 2010):
• One of the loudest voices in the better regulation
debate sees the key problem to be bureaucratic
regulation.According to this view, the dominance
of bureaucratic actors and views leads to a de-
tachment of regulatory design from the needs of
the regulatees, i.e., businesses. It is particularly
problematic that different individual regulations,
imposed by a plethora of regulators, add up to a
grid of regulations which cumulatively have a
major impact on business organisations, i.e., by
imposing high compliance costs and limiting their
flexibility. In general, regulations are regarded as
being more problematic than beneficial, and
should be kept to a minimum. If not avoidable,
regulation should rely on alternatives to classic
command-and-control approaches (government
prescribing standards that are enforced by state
authorities and backed by sanctions), and instead
rely on market-type instruments (i.e. emissions
trading) and self-regulatory systems. From this
perspective, better regulation is about reducing
the existing stock of regulation, avoiding new
excess regulation and reducing compliance costs
for businesses. Among the favourite instruments
are sunset clauses (expiry dates) for new regula-
tions and compliance cost exercises, such as the
Standard Cost Model.
• A second perspective of importance in the better
regulation debate sees the politicisation and lack
of planning in regulatory design and enforcement
as the major problem that leads to low-quality reg-
ulation. Regulations adopted in response to public
and media pressure (i.e., in the aftermath of scan-
dals and crises) are developed under high time
pressures and with a lack of sound evidence
regarding the costs and benefits of the regulation
under consideration. Such a lack of evidence-
based regulation can lead to arbitrary agenda de-
velopment and overregulation in some areas, and
too few regulations in others. Accordingly, “better
regulation” is about creating procedural and or-
ganisational devices that channel demands for reg-
ulation and allow for a cool-headed view of pro-
blems and probabilities, in particular by strength-
ening the analytical (if not scientific) component in
regulatory design and application. While defining
objectives is still regarded as the responsibility of
politicians, the selection of regulatory tools should
be based on a mandatory and controlled process of
gathering and analysing evidence of the costs,ben-
efits and potential side effects of regulation.
Primary tools include Regulatory Impact Assess-
ment on the regulatory design level, and Risk-
Based Regulation at the enforcement stage.
• A third perspective sees the Achilles’ heel of regu-
lation in the capture of the regulatory process by
the regulated industry. Building on economic
power and established networks with the political-
administrative institutions in that domain, the reg-
ulated industry (or sector more widely) is able to
shape regulatory choices according to its interests.
Regulatory capture can lead to too much regula-
tion (i.e., restricting market entry), as well as too
little regulation (i.e.,limiting social regulation such
as consumer protection standards). The preferred
tools of better regulation are all those that (seek
to) create a level playing field for all societal actors
in the regulatory process, i.e., through consultation
procedures and freedom of information rules.Given these contrasting understandings of regulato-
ry failure, the solution of the better regulation agen-
da is not (primarily) to proliferate a specific set of
substantial regulatory objectives. Instead, the core
idea is to enhance the capacity of governments to
systematically produce high-quality regulations by
embedding a range of procedural requirements and
analytical methods as part of routine policy making
(Radaelli and Meuwese 2009). These procedural
requirements aim at using analysis and evidence in
regulatory design in order to choose the least intru-
sive and most cost-effective regulatory approach to
address any regulatory issue. Such procedural stan-
dards can address various stages of the regulatory
process, from the input provided by societal actors,
to the design of regulatory standards, to the imple-
mentation or enforcement of these standards, and
finally, to their evaluation (Wegrich 2009b, 37–40).
For example, consultation procedures are related to
the input stage, while instruments of risk-based reg-
ulation address the implementation/enforcement
stage.Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) systems
are often regarded as the key instrument for “better
regulation” and are seen as the nucleus from which
further elements of a comprehensive and sustainably
better regulation strategy can be developed.A range
of subsidiary better regulation instruments – such as
consultation procedures, various forms of (regulato-
ry) cost assessment exercises, as well as cost-benefit
analyses – are attached to the framework provided
by the Impact Assessment system. RIA systems in
particular,and better regulation tools in general,rely
on a specific governance logic in order to shape reg-
ulatory design, choice and enforcement.The follow-
ing section outlines this specific governance logic
(focussing on Regulatory Impact Assessment in par-
ticular) and shows how four European governments
(including the EU Commission) have dealt with the
challenges associated with that policy model.2
Regulatory governance: towards “smarter” forms of
control
The essence of Impact Assessment systems lies in
their combination of analytical methods with proce-
dural standards.The core problem of any attempt to
further “better regulation”is the lack of natural sup-
port that policy departments provide in backing
crosscutting regulatory policies, especially when
these emerge in the form of extensive procedural
rules that effect the autonomy of departmental poli-
cy making. If the assessment criteria that structure
Impact Assessments are not part of the set of criteria
usually relevant for a specific unit of government,
taking these systematically into account will not be
the first priority of the policy bureaucrats in that unit
(think of the relevance of a compliance cost assess-
ment for a ministry of the environment).By defining
analytical methods as procedural standards, the
usage of these methods can be standardised and con-
trolled from the position of an organisation or unit
that is separated from the regulatory institution
itself. This is needed to avoid patchy and episodic,
rather than systematic, usage of the analytical tools
prescribed by RIA rules. In other words, RIA sys-
tems and other better regulation tools require and
facilitate the development of internal governance
structures to monitor and enforce compliance with
procedural standards.
To address this challenge, the OECD (2005, 3) advis-
es that sustained commitment from the top is
required, which involves an adequately staffed unit
for “better regulation” at the centre of government
(i.e.,the prime minister’s/president’s office or finance
ministry). Debates regarding the location of dedicat-
ed better regulation units have been prominent in all
four governments under discussion here (see Table 1
for an overview). In the United Kingdom, the initial
deregulation unit moved from the then Department
of Trade and Industry to the cabinet office, where it
went through various incarnations (Baldwin 2005). It
has since moved back to the renamed Department of
Trade and Industry, now the Department for Busi-
ness, Innovation and Skills. External commissions
(such as the Better Regulation Task Force and later
the Better Regulation Commission) have been set up
to review regulatory approaches and offer advice to
government on the further development of the better
regulation agenda.
The Netherlands has a similarly long history of com-
missions and units established in various depart-
ments, with the justice ministry being the first host
institution and the Ministry of Economic Affairs get-
ting involved in the mid-1990s. The latter ministry
also played host to an inter-ministerial unit for ad-
ministrative burden on business (IPAL),but the unit
was shifted to the finance ministry in 2003, where it
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increased its influence and reputation (beyond the
Dutch borders). IPAL became the Regulatory
Reform Group (RRG) in 2007 and was merged with
other units from the economics department.But,the
Netherlands is mainly known for the institutionalisa-
tion of an independent monitoring unit (ACTAL)
that is not part of the governmental hierarchy, but
has the right to participate in the law-making process
by providing opinions on the quality of departmen-
tal cost assessment exercises. In Germany, responsi-
bility for regulatory quality has traditionally been
distributed across ministries, mainly the Federal
Ministry of the Interior and the economics ministry,
but also the justice ministry. In 2006, a better regula-
tion unit was established in the chancellor’s office,
which also hosts the independent national
Normenkontrollrat – a watchdog, modelled on the
Dutch example, tasked to check ex ante departmen-
tal measurements of administrative costs and to
advise government on better lawmaking.At the EU
level, the DG Enterprise has established itself as the
main administrative backbone of a range of better
regulation initiatives. The Secretariat General is
responsible for the Impact Assessment system and
the supervision of DGs’ compliance (supported by
the Impact Assessment Board, attached to the
Secretariat General). The strengthening of ad-
ministrative and advisory capacities in the Commis-
sion has addressed the long-standing lack of admin-
istrative resources to monitor and support compli-
ance by DGs (Radaelli and Meuwese 2010).
Location and support from the top are not every-
thing, however.Agendas and concerns of politicians
at the top change, and “better regulation” can hard-
ly be expected to remain a personal priority of lead-
ing government politicians over a longer time peri-
od. More important is the way such a unit, wherever
located, seeks to persuade other departments and
governmental units to follow its agenda. One per-
spective is to steer via hierarchical means.That is, to
rely on the setting of procedural standards, setting
targets,monitoring compliance,checking administra-
tive burden reduction plans and instituting adminis-
trative sanctions. The UK strongly relies on these
mechanisms in enforcing better regulation rules.
Such an approach may not only conflict with consti-
tutional conventions (it would be in tension with the
constitutional departmental principle as one of the
three organising principles for the federal govern-
ment in Germany); continued oversight is also
extremely costly and is likely to have a detrimental
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  Source: Own compilation.effect on the motivation of policy-making officials in
departments.
A different approach is to rely on benchmarking,self-
reporting and “naming and shaming”.Again, the risk
is that the race for high quality regulation will become
one of creative benchmark-hitting. A different
approach to this rivalry-driven approach to better
regulation is to rely on mutual learning. That is, to
establish “high quality regulation watchers” in each
department and to ensure that they communicate and
learn from each other.The high quality agenda, from
that perspective, is a process of mutual learning and
not a process of intervening into departmental turf by
the imposition of external criteria. However, such a
process is inherently limited if departmental objec-
tives conflict with those of the cross-cutting better
regulation agenda, whether in terms of substantive
objectives or in terms of preferred policy style.
In practice, many governments have long relied on a
combination of hierarchy and cooperative styles of
control – usually in the form of combining process
standards with support infrastructure, including so-
called satellite units of central better regulation units
in departments. More recently, governments are
deploying other combinations of control modes in
order to overcome their individual downsides. One
recent shift is to move to targets as a variation of
hierarchical modes of control. Most EU member
countries have followed the Dutch model by adopt-
ing reduction targets for administrative burden
imposed on businesses by government regulation,
usually 25 percent.
Another trend in control relations is to link quality
assurance processes to mechanisms of (semi) public
naming and shaming. For example, the EU
Commission’s RIA quality control unit, the Impact
Assessment Board, publishes its opinions on the
quality of the Impact Assessments carried out by the
Directorates General (but only after the completion
of the law-making process). In the Netherlands and
Germany,similar mechanisms of publishing opinions
of external watchdogs (here attached to the draft
laws) have played a key role in achieving depart-
mental compliance. According to empirical analysis
of draft laws from the parliamentary term of 2005 to
2009 in Germany,3 the compliance with the rules to
carry out an ex ante assessment of administrative
costs is close to 100 percent (though the quality of
the measurements vary). In the UK, such strong ex
ante mechanisms are non-existent and hence com-
pliance with and quality of cost measurement exer-
cises are problematic (NAO 2009).But overall,more
governments move towards smarter forms of quality
assurance and control of better regulation standards.
The politics of “better regulation”: compromises
and disappointment
Smarter forms of enforcing compliance are critical
for any effective better regulation governance strat-
egy and a precondition for the better regulation
agenda to have any impact. However, they only pro-
vide for the internal condition for effective better
regulation strategies. The second precondition is to
align different understandings of regulatory failure
and related demands for improving the quality of
regulations. As discussed above, these understand-
ings do vary substantially,and better regulation poli-
cies are based on the relative strength of coalitions
advocating their understanding of better regulation.
This section compares how the four governments’
RIA systems and approaches to administrative bur-
den reduction (using the SCM method) have been
shaped by different advocacy groups. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview on the design of those two (relat-
ed) better regulation policy tools.
The design of regulatory Impact Assessment systems
in particular has been shaped by a tug-of-war
between different advocacy coalitions, in particular
between those that regard RIA as an ideal site for
de-politicising the regulatory process and strength-
ening the scientific aspect in regulatory design on the
one and those who see RIA as a way to avoid exces-
sive regulation on the other hand. From the first,
technocratic, perspective, RIA is about comprehen-
sive cost-benefit analysis regarding economic, social
and environmental criteria. The RIA (later IA) sys-
tem, which has been developed since the early 2000s
by the European Commission, follows this broad
approach and has the ambition to provide the evi-
dence base for assessing different broad policy pack-
ages combining various regulatory and other policy
tools.Also, attempts in Germany to establish strong
RIA systems in the 1990s and early 2000s (following
up on failed attempts in the 1980s) follow this idea of
comprehensive tests of costs and benefits of discrete
policy options.In the UK,the same understanding of
Impact Assessment became dominant in the late
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1990s, when the incoming new Labour government
attempted to demarcate itself from the emphasis on
deregulation and limiting compliance costs that was
the dominant view under Conservative leadership.
Following that understanding, RIAs are a tool to
control departmental policy making and in particu-
lar limit excessive regulation; RIA procedures are
more narrowly focussed on assessment of costs com-
ing with regulations, in particular compliance costs
for business.
Overall,the technocratic view dominated the develop-
ment of RIA systems and better regulation policy
more widely until the early to mid 2000s, however
without fully neglecting the other perspectives. The
participatory view on better regulation was reflected
in more transparent and open consultancy procedures.
The deregulation view was recognised in rules pre-
scribing the testing of alternatives to command-and-
control regulations and to systematically consider the
“doing nothing” option. But in particular, the ‘deregu-
lators’ were disappointed by the limited effectiveness
of RIA as challenging regulatory growths. The unex-
pected rise of a Standard Cost Model (SCM) as a new
method of measuring regulatory burden was therefore
very much welcomed by this sub-community.Drawing
on the perceived success of the SCM in the
Netherlands,the idea of accounting the administrative
(or paper work) costs of complying with regulation
was endorsed in the UK in 2005.The UK government
invested heavily (mainly in consultancy fees) to catch-
up with the Dutch (and Danish) frontrunners and con-
ducted a so-called baseline measurement of all laws as
the starting point for reduction exercises within a few
months. Since then, the SCM model has quickly dif-
fused across Europe (see Figure 1) and provided tail-
winds for those who see RIA as a way to limit exces-
sive regulation, if not to reduce it. Germany jumped
on the bandwagon in 2006 and the European Commis-
sion started its own initiative around the same time,
Table 2 
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  Source: Own compilation. also recommending to all member states that similar
initiatives aiming at reducing administrative burden
by 25 percent should be launched.
The SCM model was widely perceived as a solution
to the long-standing concern of too much bureau-
cratic regulation. At the same time, technocrats in
countries with weak RIA systems, like Germany,
could live with this policy boom, because the SCM
method was seen as the first step towards a compre-
hensive RIA system. However, the SCM has disap-
pointed both advocacy groups. While the reduction
of paperwork costs plays too limited a role in the
perceived regulatory burden of business to satisfy
the deregulators, the technocrats were disappointed
by the crowding out of their concerns by the admin-
istrative burden reduction policy boom. At the time
of writing (early 2010), a new cycle of contestation
for dominance in the design of the RIA system can
be observed in Germany and the UK.In the UK,the
disappointment with the limitations of the SCM has
facilitated a renewed interest in the benefits of regu-
lation, as reflected in a report from the Department
of Business, Industry and Skills (BIS 2009). In
Germany, the debate centres on the future capacity
of the Normenkontrollrat – and proposals alternate
between expanding the measurement of regulatory
costs beyond paper work costs (following the Dutch
example) and changing its role into a quality control
of broader Impact Assessments.While the advocacy
coalition supporting comprehensive IA approaches
has received tailwind from a political initiative to
intruduce a Sustainability Impact Test, the deregula-
tory view has received additional support from the
liberal party in the new governing coalition.
These conflicts and pendulum
swings are unlikely to disappear
completely in the future, given
the existence of competing ex-
pectations regarding what “bet-
ter regulation” should deliver.
Rather than solving the tension
between different views on good
and bad regulation by establish-
ing neutral procedures of better
regulation, these procedures be-
come the site of political contro-
versy and contestation – thereby
undermining the consistency of
better regulation policy.
Conclusion
The comparison of experiences of European govern-
ments with better regulation tools shows substantial
improvements in controlling the regulatory process.
Robust governance structures at the centre of gov-
ernment are in place in three of the four cases the
paper looked at (with the frontrunner UK displaying
surprisingly fluid structures); and smarter ways of
controlling the regulatory process in ministries have
been developed over time, in particular with respect
to the careful applications of naming and shaming
strategies as a way to overcome the limits of hierar-
chy. However, the four governments have been less
successful in managing the in-built tension between
different expectations concerning what “better regu-
lation” should deliver. In designing a better regula-
tion programme, governments have to choose
between Scylla and Charybdis – an over-inclusive
approach that lacks coherence and an approach that
is too narrow and only addresses the demands of one
particular advocacy group. Given the complexity of
the better regulation policy model, policy coherence
with a limited focus could provide a more promising
road to delivering substantial results than over-inclu-
sive policies.
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